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Christopher G. Tiedeman, 'Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism' and the Dilemmas of Small-Scale
Property in the Gilded Age
LOUISE A. HALPER*
"If we want things to stay as they are,
things will have to change."'
I. INTRODUCTION
With the "explosion" of written law after the Civil War, in statutes and in
case reporters,2 digests and encyclopedias of the law proliferated as an aid to
both bench and bar. Through their efforts at synthesis, the treatise writers who
brought together the written law from its ever-increasing sources became, in a
sense, legal masons. They laid brick upon brick to articulate the law of divorce,3
of the Constitution, 4 of constitutional limitations,5 of nuisance,' of municipali-
ties;7 virtually no area of the law was left unreconstructed. Of those who fol-
lowed this builders' craft, few were more prolific than Christopher G.
Tiedeman. Though he died before reaching fifty, he had by then published
seven full-length treatises, two textbooks, more than a score of articles, and a
major centenary reconsideration of the Constitution. 8 Particularly in his con-
struction of the interaction of property and the police power, Tiedeman played
* Coordinator, Lawyering Program, New York University School of Lav. The author wishes to express her
gratitude to Bill Nelson and Tony Amsterdam for their comments on a first draft of this paper and to the mem-
bers of the New York University Legal History Colloquium to whom an earlier version of this paper was
presented, particularly Judy Gilbert, Jim Kainen, Bill LaPiana and Ed Purcell, all of whose comments hit the
mark. Thanks are also due to Geoff Weaver for his able research assistance.
1. G. DILAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 26 (1966). The words are spoken by the heir of the princely protagonist
on the eve of the 1860 liberation of the Kingdom of Sicily by the republican Garibaldi and his troops.
2. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 15, 20
(1987).
3. J. BISHOP. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1881).
4. J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1888).
5. T. COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
6. H. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS; INCLUDING
REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY (1875).
7. J. DILLON. THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1873).
8. Tiedeman's first book, AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Was pub-
lished in 1885 and thereafter he published treatises on the police power (1886), commercial paper (1889), the
Constitution (1890), sales (1891), equity (1893) and local government (1894), and two textbooks, one on real
property (1897) and one on commercial paper (1898). He also published a substantially expanded revision of the
police power treatise (1900), numerous articles, addresses, book reviews and other short pieces.
I rely here primarily upon Tiedeman's work on the police power, which was first published in 1886 as A
TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES [hereinafter LPP], and which was
subsequently released in a revised two-volume edition in 1900 as A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL
OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES [hereinafter SFC], and upon Tiedeman's paper for the Mis-
souri Bar Association on the occasion of the centenary of the Constitution, which was published in book form in
1890 as THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDA-
MENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW [hereinafter UC]. I also draw upon several of Tiedeman's articles.
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an important role in framing for the Gilded Age the central questions posed by
the expansion of government and of enterprise.
Today Tiedeman is remembered chiefly as one of the fiercely conservative
legal thinkers whose doctrines the New Deal discredited after reactionary courts
had used them as constitutional weapons to fend off attacks on big business by
populist-backed legislatures. But the theme that is predominant in Tiedeman's
work throughout the course of his intellectual career, we can now see, is not the
antimajoritarian one. In fact, it is the fear of large-scale institutions, whether in
the economy or in the government, overwhelming small-scale enterprise. This
fear led him to focus alternately on the perils of democratic majorities bent on
redistribution and on the dangers of big business quashing competition in the
marketplace.
As the United States increasingly became a nation of employees and em-
ployers, rather than individual entrepreneurs, Tiedeman probably presented an
accurate reflection of a disappearing social group that saw itself squeezed be-
tween two expanding classes. On the one hand, the propertyless seemed to
threaten those who hold property; on the other, those with great concentrations
of property seemed to threaten smallholders.
The social and economic fears of the latter are expressed in Tiedeman's
jurisprudence, which resists governmental regulation of the economy until the
moment when only government intervention can save it from disappearance. He
then would demand the most extreme remedies, including nationalization and
takeover of banks, railroads, communications, insurance, indeed, of all enter-
prise which cannot operate outside the corporate framework. This remedy, he
explains, will save private property.
Though a supporter of judicial review, one who believed the signal value of
the Constitution was precisely the means it gave of thwarting the popular will,
by the end of his life, it was to the legislative power he appealed for the nation-
alization of great enterprises that he thought required to preserve a competitive
marketplace. Necessarily, this unstable position led to inconsistencies between
his early and later work; yet, it may be said, the early work, in its fears of the
concentration of power, prefigures the later.
In this Article, after a sketch of Tiedeman's life, I consider the modern
view of this author and the issues of government and economy central to his
thought; I then discuss his search for limitations on government and whether
they are located in the Constitution. Finally, I discuss Tiedeman's view of mo-
nopoly and the justification for government takeover, concluding with a discus-
sion of his search for a means to maintain a competitive economy.
II. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
The evidence of Tiedeman's early life is limited.9 Born in 1857 into an
apparently well-to-do family in Charleston, South Carolina, he was bright as a
9. I have not located Tiedeman's papers or even confirmed that they are extant. Tiedeman's widow offered
his papers to the New York University School of Law, but they were not accepted. Interview with John Reid
(May, 1989). Biographical details are taken from a sketch published on the occasion of his accession as Dean of
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youth, graduating from the College of Charleston at eighteen. After college, he
went abroad to study in Germany, possibly living with relatives, and attended
the lectures of von Jhering and others of the German free law movement."0 He
received his law degree from Columbia University in 1879 and returned to
Charleston, where he practiced law briefly. He then moved to St. Louis and,
after a year of practice, during which he wrote on legal topics for regional law
journals,' joined the law faculty of the University of Missouri in 1881 as an
assistant professor. He became a full professor the following year and never
again practiced law. Tiedeman spent ten years teaching in Missouri at a time of
intense populist and antimonopoly agitation in that state."2
In 1883, at the age of twenty-six, he published his first treatise, The Law of
Real Property, and it remained in print for the next forty years. He then pub-
lished A Treatise on the Law of Commercial Paper (1889), The Unwritten
Constitution of the United States (1890) and A Treatise on the Law of Sales of
Personal Property (1891), together with A Treatise on the Limitations of the
Police Power (1886), the first edition of this work.
In 1891, he accepted an offer of a professorship at the law school of the
University of the City of New York (later New York University School of
Law). While in New York, he published A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence
(1893) and A Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations in the United
States (1894), as well as articles, inter alia, on legal education,'" the role of
precedent in the law,' 4 the Supreme Court's view of monetary policy,'5 and the
constitutional origins of judicial review.' The university granted him the honor-
ary degree of Doctor of Laws in 1895. In 1897, he left the New York position
to devote his time entirely to writing, producing a number of articles, two texts,
the Buffalo Law School, CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN. LL.D., 6 THE IRIS (1903), 18 THE DICTIONARY OF AMERI-
CAN BIOGRAPHY 531 (1946) and WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, 1903-05 1483 (1903).
10. Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892) was a German "legal scientist," of the late nineteenth century, best
known in this country as a proto-realist critic of formalism in the civil law; see von Jhering, In the Heaven of
Legal Concepts, in F. COHEN & M. COHEN. READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 678-89
(1951). For a discussion of von Jhering's impact on the American realists, see J. Herget & S. Wallace, The
German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 407-09 (1987).
Tiedeman read von Jhering as an anti-Austinian historicist, a proponent of law as the product of social forces. See,
e.g., UC, supra note 8, at 145 n.1.
11. The articles were on a variety of topics, but their general format was a review of recent cases for the
benefit of practitioners. See. e.g., The Right of a Stranger to Maintain an Action upon a Contract, 11 CENTRAL
LJ. 161 (1880); Impossibility of Performance as a Defense to Actions ex Contractu, 12 CENTRAL Li. 4 (1881);
The Liability of Banks in Making Collections for the Acts of Correspondents and Notaries, 12 CENTRAL Li. 149
(1881); Conflict of Laws in Relation to Marriage, 12 CENTRAL LJ. 510 (1881); Contract by Telegraph-I, 28
PITTSEURGH LJ. 457 (1881); Contract by Telegraph-lI, 28 PITrSEURGH Li. 467 (1881).
12. See S. PIOTT, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS
IN THE MIDWEST 33-71 (1985); D. THELEN. PATHS OF RESISTANCE: TRADITION AND DIGNITY IN INDUSTRIALIZING
MISSOURI (1986).
13. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE LJ. 150 (1892).
14. C. Tiedeman, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and A Proposed Modification of its Practical Application in
the Evolution of the Law, 19 PROCEEDINGS N.Y. ST. BAR ASSOC. (1896) [hereinafter Stare Decisis]; Dictum and
Decision, 6 COLUMEIA LAW TIMES 35 (1892); The Law Writer's Services to the Profession, 1 INTERCOLLEGIATE
LJ. 137 (1892).
15. C. Tiedeman, Silver Free Coinage and the Legal Tender Decisions, 9 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACAD-
EMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 198 (1897).
16. C. Tiedeman, The Political Significance of the Case of Marbury v. Madison, 2 THE BRIEF 3 (1899).
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Selected Cases on Real Property (1897) and A Treatise on the Law of Bills
and Notes (1898), and the revision of the police power work, A Treatise on
State and Federal Control of Persons and Property in the United States
(1900). In 1902, he became Dean of the Law School of the University of Buf-
falo. A year later, shortly after the publication of an important article on gov-
ernment ownership of monopolies, 17 he died. According to a memorial tribute,
"His kindly interest in young men, his profound learning, his sincere character,
and his gentlemanly manners, endeared him alike to his students and to his
associates." '
His work was a staple of both courts and academia. His textbooks re-
mained in print through the twenties and his treatises were cited through the
forties in well over 400 opinions of the highest courts of the states.'9 He saw his
work and that of the other legal synthesists active in the Gilded Age as making
concrete and explicit the implications of the law developed in the courtroom and
legislative chamber.2 0 His own assessment was that his task had been "to pre-
sent in a clear light the rule of law, as it emerges from the clashing interests
represented by . . .decisions."
211
III. TIEDEMAN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In the books of Clyde Jacobs," Arnold Paul,' 3 and Benjamin Twiss, 2" his-
torians in the Progressive tradition,'2 Tiedeman is depicted as a publicist who
brought to the courts the economic constitutionalism exemplified by Lochner v.
New York"8 and then swept away by the New Deal. For them, Tiedeman is a
figure within the mainstream of "laissez-faire constitutionalism," a doctrine of
substantive due process, economic liberalism, and liberty of contract. Jacobs,
Paul, and Twiss have been criticized by others in respect to their discussions of
the lawyers and judges of the Gilded Age.' Those criticisms often point out a
failure to recognize jurisprudential motives for the approval of applications of
17. C. Tiedeman, Government Ownership of Public Utilities, 16 HARv. L. REV. 476 (1903).
18. "Memorial," Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Council of the University of Buffalo (October 8,
1903) (available in the Archives of the State University of New York, Buffalo).
19. See, e.g., Indiana Bd. of Medical Registration v. Suelean, 219 Ind. 321, 327, 26 A.2d 865, 869 (1942);
Sherlock v. Duck Creek Twp., 338 Mo. 866, 875, 92 S.W.2d 675, 679 (1936) (citing Tiedeman on Commercial
Paper); Camden Trust Co. V. Handle, 132 N.J. Eq. 97, 102, 26 A.2d 865, 869 (1941) (citing
LPP).
20. "Standing beyond the heat and excitement of party strife and the contention for the assertion and protec-
tion of private rights, the well-trained legal author is better able than either judges or practitioners to decide what
principles of law are being developed in litigation and what modifications of established principles are being
thereby effected." The Law Writer's Services to the Profession, supra note 14, at 138-39.
21. Id.
22. C. JACOBS. LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS M. COOLEY. CHRISTOPHER G.
TIEDEMAN AND JOHN F. DILLON UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954).
23. A. PAUL. CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895
(1976).
24. B. TwiSS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942 & repr. ed. 1962).
25. For a discussion of that tradition, see Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REV. 679
(1984).
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27. See, e.g., Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: A Reconsideration, 53 J. Am.
HIST. 751 (1967); Gold, Redfield, Railroads and the Roots of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 27 AM. J. LEGAL
[Vol. 51:1349
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laissez-faire constitutionalism other than deference to the aims of enterprise.2 8
But rarely can these three have been as inapt as in their portrayal of this figure,
many of whose strongly-held opinions they appear simply to have ignored. They
may perhaps be excused, for the later Tiedeman reads differently than the ear-
lier; it may have been the former on whom these historians relied to form their
judgment.
The focus of Tiedeman's thinking changed with the waning of the century.
He wrote in the eighties primarily as an opponent of regulation, which then
seemed to him equivalent to, or at least threatening, redistribution. By the close
of the nineties, that decade of economic concentration, depression, and labor
unrest, he argued forcefully that only nationalization of banks, railroads, insur-
ance, and communications could preserve small-scale enterprise from a socialis-
tic public sentiment that arose in reaction to the depredations of large-scale
enterprise. Of this one finds no hint in the bare characterization of Tiedeman as
a laissez-faire ideologue. 9
A. Tiedeman in "Progressive" Historiography
Clyde Jacobs, in his classic and influential 1954 book, said of Tiedeman,
"When other authorities were lacking on a given proposition of laissez faire or
when they were hostile to that proposition, the bench and bar might confidently
refer to works of Tiedeman for support."30 It was Tiedeman, together with
Thomas M. Cooley, who were "instrumental in the formulation, development,
and application of the liberty of contract principle as a limitation upon the po-
Hisr. 254 (1983); Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 386-88
(1988).
28. See Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIsT. REV. 293, 298 (1985), arguing that the Progressive historians' overall view of
laissez-faire constitutionalism neglects its "congruen[ce] with a well-established and accepted principle of Ameri-
can liberty." Benedict makes a fourth Progressive historian, Sidney Fine, his target. Fine's book, LAIssEz-FAIRE
AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 1865-1901 (1964), does not
discuss Tiedeman, though Cooley plays a role in it.
29. Two distinguished modem legal historians have also neglected this aspect of Tiedeman's thinking. Her-
bert Hovenkamp refers to Tiedeman's "extremely narrow" view of the state's police power in The Classical Cor-
poration in American Legal Thought, 76 GEo. LJ. 1593, 1624 (1988). Tiedeman in fact believed that the govern-
ment's police power was broad enough to encompass takeover of major elements of the economy. See infra text
accompanying notes 177-86.
Morton J. Horwitz very aptly identifies Tiedeman's economic thinking as the product of "the anguish of the
old conservative witnessing the rise of industrial concentration," and notes Tiedeman's opposition to free incorpo-
ration in Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 206 (1985), but
does not mention that Tiedeman went further and called for nationalization of the great concentrations of capital.
See also, J. May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and
Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257, 264-65 (1989), citing JACOBS, supra note 22, for the claim
that "state courts increasingly invoked . . . the scholarly work of Thomas M. Cooley and Christopher G.
Tiedeman, to support establishment of a thoroughgoing laissez-faire constitutionalism ......
Modern-day conservatives have also claimed the antimajoritarian Tiedeman as their own, ignoring the propo-
nent of nationalization, see e.g., M. Debow & D. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A
Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TE. L. REv. 993, 1004 nA7 (1988). On the other side, Tiedeman's view of
law as a product of social forces, see infra text accompanying notes 108-22, has led one writer to describe his
picture of the Constitution as "anticipating the point of view of progressive historians such as Charles Beard .... "
Belz, The Constitution in the Gilded Age: The Beginnings of Constitutional Realism in American Scholarship, in
ESSAYS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 580, 594 (W. Holt ed. 1976).
30. Jacobs, supra note 22, at 62.
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lice power of the state. ... ,,31 According to Jacobs, "[T]he force and prestige of
his work undoubtedly derived from its logical consistency and rigor. ' 32 Jacobs'
Tiedeman is a creative legal scholar who "deserves credit for... crystallization
[of laissez-faire] into a fixed and pervading dogma. '33 Jacobs believed
Tiedeman's influence was "most pronounced" where courts struck down statutes
which barred discrimination against trade unions.34
Jacobs' version is adopted by Arnold Paul.3 5 For Paul, Tiedeman is the
"link" 36 between late nineteenth century laissez-faire thinking and the legal
conservatism that Paul implies derives from the Federalists.3 7 According to
Paul, it was Tiedeman who "had marked out the course by which conservatism
could resist the tides of change and maintain substantially intact the status
quo."38 Drawing on Jacobs, Paul says "Tiedeman's chapters on 'Police Regula-
tions of Trades and Professions' and 'Police Regulation of the Relation of
Master and Servant,' which hemmed in the legislative power at every point,
became rich source grounds for citations justifying judicial invalidation of state
regulation."39
Benjamin Twiss, one of the early New Deal legal historians, considered
Tiedeman the writer who shepherded the courts to the new individualism of
liberty of contract-the John the Baptist of the Lochner court, as it were. It was
"[thanks to Tiedeman's Limitations on the Police Power that the doctrine of
liberty of contract spread in a short time to many state courts," and
"[e]ventually . . . reached the Supreme Court .... ,,4o According to Twiss,
"Professors Cooley and Tiedeman were largely successful in making the Su-
preme Court an economic court."' 41 Tiedeman was a "legal publicist"42 whose
triumph was to make the idea of limited government "respectable. 43
In this view, treatise writers like Tiedeman and Cooley constructed a theo-
retical framework which, from the nineties on, encouraged the "bad judicial
review" 44 that supported big business and the railroads and blocked appropriate
responses to the economic problems of the turn of the century. Not until 1937
and the New Deal reorientation of the Supreme Court of the United States was
31. Id. at vi.
32. Id. at 62.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 76.
35. PAUL, supra note 23.
36. Id. at 18,
37. Id. at 4-5.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 17. Paul refers here to Chapters IX and XIV, respectively, of the 1886 edition of the police power
treatise.
40. Twiss, supra note 24, at 129.
41. Id. at 257 (emphasis in original). Paul, Twiss, Jacobs and others have written that Cooley's work both
formulated and lent support to laissez-faire ideologies, but Jones, supra note 27, at 751, has concluded that "a
reconsideration of these assessments is needed ... 
42. Twiss. supra note 24, at 122.
43. Id.
44. PAUL, supra note 23, at xvi (emphasis in original).
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the influence of the conservatives overthrown and the need for government con-
trol and oversight of big capital entirely vindicated.4 5
B. Tiedeman as Reactionary
A good deal of Tiedeman's fearsome reputation as a reactionary is based
upon the Preface to the first edition of his treatise on the police power, pub-
lished in 1886,46 and a centenary view of the Constitution published in 1890.47
In those pieces, Tiedeman, in forceful, even dire, language, described what "the
conservative classes" 48 saw around them after the Haymarket bombing.49 "So-
cialism, Communism, and Anarchism are rampant throughout the civilized
world," he wrote:
Contemplating ... the great army of discontents, and their apparent power, with the
growth and development of universal suffrage, to enforce their views of civil polity
upon the civilized world, the conservative classes stand in constant fear of the advent
of an absolutism more tyrannical and more unreasoning than any before experienced
by man, the absolutism of a democratic majority.50
This seems to summarize the fears of a ruling elite: the economic discontent of
a propertyless majority, when it can be expressed at the ballot box, may impose
unacceptable conditions of economic and political life upon the property-owning
minority. Tiedeman proposes to solve the problem by reading the Constitution
as containing "limitations to protect private rights against the radical experi-
mentations of social reformers ... "51
The conservation of private rights confines the exercise of state power to
"the detailed enforcement . . ."51 of "the legal maxim, which enunciates the
fundamental rule of both the human and the natural law, sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non laedas [Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure
that of another] .53 Any legislation going beyond sic utere "is a governmental
usurpation .... ,,54 Indeed, "[t]he unwritten law of this country is in the main
against the exercise of the police power ...... ,5 No doubt for most who read
Tiedeman in his lifetime, and certainly for those who read him after his death
in 1903, this is the sum of his thinking. Particularly for the Progressive histori-
ans, Tiedeman was simply one of the intellectual bulwarks of a ruling class
45. Id. at 237.
46. LPP, supra note 8.
47. UC, supra note 8.
48. LPP, supra note 8, at vii.
49. On May 4, 1886, in the course of a campaign for the eight-hour work day, a bomb was thrown at a labor
rally in Chicago and police responded with gunfire, causing death and injury. Seven people were indicted for
conspiracy and convicted; four were hanged and three pardoned. The Haymarket bombing fixed in the public
mind the image of union organizers as anarchists and terrorists. See H. DAVID, THE HISTORY OF THE HAYMARKET
AFFAIR (1963).
50. LPP, supra note 8, at vii. Tiedeman discounted the possibility of real democracy. Echoing Sir Henry
Maine, he wrote, "All governments are either monarchies or oligarchies." UC, supra note 8, at 121.
51. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at viii.
52. Id. at vii.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 5.
55. LPP, supra note 8, at 10.
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well-provided with the wherewithal to support academic clients and in need of
''a constitutional law favorable to the laissez faire economic philosophy . . .56
It is not the purpose of this paper to argue that Tiedeman is a forgotten
genius of the common law, an early prophet, or even a scholar of rare insight.
But neither is he the cardboard cut-out conservative of the Gilded Age. Indeed,
his writing reveals his orientation to have been, if anything, hostile to economic
concentration and large-scale enterprise. Although it is how he came to be read,
the goal of preventing democratic majorities from limiting the rights of property
lost its paramount position in his thinking and writing, and, at least by 1900,
another issue assumed greater proportions, one many of the Progressives, had
they taken notice, would have found congenial: Tiedeman wanted the law to
ensure "that the small tradesman, manufacturer and artisan, sh[ould] not be
driven to the wall, overpowered by the giant combinations." 57
Far from being a narrow proponent of laissez-faire, he sought to enlist the
power of the state toward the preservation of small business. This aim seems to
have been present in his thinking in a somewhat inchoate form ab initio, but its
development required the immense growth of productive forces and the "con-
centration and oligopoly ' 58 of the Gilded Age. Somewhat ambivalently in the
1886 version of his police power treatise,59 more concretely and broadly in the
1900 revision,60 and explicitly in a Harvard Law Review article published three
months before his death in 1903, Tiedeman called for the federal government to
take over the great enterprises he called public utilities. Only thus could small-
scale enterprise survive.
Perhaps nationalization as the proposal of an anti-majoritarian ideologue of
smallholders could not be acknowledged by Progressive legal historians, cele-
brating the victories of the New Deal over its reactionary predecessors.61 Per-
haps it is simply the case that his first, and more conventional, edition of the
police power treatise was cited more widely than the second, and was thus more
familiar to legal historians.6 2 For whatever reason, Tiedeman was lumped to-
gether with conservative jurists like James Coolidge Carter and Joseph Choate,
whose careers were in the service of the giant combinations Tiedeman so
opposed.6 3
56. JACOBS, supra note 22, at 22.
57. SFC, supra note 8, at 611.
58. A. CHANDLER. THE VISIBLE HAND 489 (1977).
59. LPP, supra note 8, at 326-27.
60. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 586-612. Significantly, Tiedeman renamed the second edition of his treatise on
the police power, calling it STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY, rather than LIMITATIONS
ON THE POLICE POWER. In the second edition, little of the earlier material was deleted, but a good deal was added
which expanded the view of the power of the state to control the economy.
61. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 23, at 229 ("[I]n the critical days of the New Deal .... a new popular-based
reformism ran up against the constitutional and legal defences that had been erected in the 1890's .... ").
62. The first treatise is cited by state high courts almost 60 times; the second version, less than 25. States
library, High Cts file. See. e.g., cases cited supra note 19. For an example of a high court citation to the first
edition when the second was already extant, see infra note 148.
63. Twiss, supra note 24, Chapter VIII passim.
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IV. GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE
A. Small-Scale Enterprise as Key to Tiedeman's Thought
A more accurate picture of Tiedeman may be that he attempted to carry
forward into the twentieth century, though without marked success, the pre-
Civil War republican ideal of the American economy as a congeries of small
dealers, entrepreneurs, manufacturers, and artisans who competed on a roughly
equal level in small-scale markets." Aided by government assistance to local
and regional economies, it would be unhampered by government control.6 5 But
having begun by fighting government control by legislative majorities fixed, as
he thought, on redistributive schemes, Tiedeman came to believe that his real
battle was with his own side, and that the threat to small-scale enterprise was
from big capital, not government or labor.6" He is representative of the confu-
sions of a group no longer able to fare on its own, but equally bemused by the
alternatives presented to it.67
Concern for individual enterprise was the touchstone of Tiedeman's intel-
lectual career. That is evident as early as the 1886 Preface, written when he
was in his twenties and containing perhaps the most inflammatory writing of his
career. Then, Tiedeman considered government, whether autocracy or democ-
racy, the great threat to individual rights. He described the individual as unpro-
tected when a monarch could "impose numerous restrictions, all tending to op-
press the weaker for the benefit of the stronger. '6 But when the divine right of
kings disappeared "and the opposite principle [was] substituted," 69 the individ-
ual might still feel "the encroachments of ... government upon his rights and
liberty."70 Later "the popularization of the so-called laissez-faire doctrine" 1
served as a restraint on democracy. But laissez-faire disappeared as "[the State
64. W. NELSON, THE RooTs OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 52 (1982) ("[S]ocial and economic
realities in the egalitarian, mid-nineteenth century rural North .... [included] small property owners and small
businessmen [who] contracted with one another on a free and equal basis.").
65. M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION 29 (1960) ("The hardy race of independent republicans, en-
gaged in plain and useful toil, need no more than a stable government of equal laws to secure their equal rights.").
66. Like the Jacksonians, he perceived the threat to the republic as coming from the direction of "concentra-
tions of wealth arising suddenly from financial manipulation and special privilege .... MEYERS, supra note 65,
at 23. See infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
67. He is perhaps an inheritor of what Meyers called "the Jacksonian struggle to reconcile ... the simple
yeoman values with the free pursuit of economic interest, just as the two were splitting hopelessly apart." MEYERS,
supra note 65, at 15.
There is of course a danger in pushing the Jacksonian connection too hard. For one thing, Tiedeman was
clearly antidemocratic in his opposition to allowing majoritarian legislation and favored judicial review precisely
as a restraint. But more to the point, the Jacksonian ideology is so protean and unstable that it will support a
great many conclusions about who its true descendants are. For example, McCurdy argues, in Justice Field and
the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HisT. 970, 973 et passim (1975), that Field, whose dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting), later became the foundation of the economic Constitu-
tion, was writing out of a Jacksonian tradition; Tiedeman, about whom I make the same argument, believed
fervently that Field's dissent was wrongheaded and that only adherence to the Slaughterhouse majority position
could protect the public from overreaching by monopolists. See infra text accompanying notes 168-74.
68. LPP, supra note 8, at v.
69. Id.
70. Id. at vi.
71. Id.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
[was] called upon to protect the weak against.., the [strong] ."2 In a monar-
chy, the strong may oppress the weak and in a democracy, the weak may be
protected from the strong; but both oppression and protection are objectionable
as unwarranted exercises of government power. And why? "Many trades and
occupations are being prohibited because some are damaged incidentally by
their prosecution, and many ordinary pursuits are made government
monopolies. 13
B. The Economic Background
Tiedeman's era was one in which concentration and oligopoly were fast
becoming the order of the day. "Almost nonexistent at the end of the 1870's ...
integrated enterprises came to dominate many of the nation's most vital indus-
tries in less than three decades." 4 Large firms were escaping from market disci-
pline, from "a market in which participants were numerous enough and modest
and equal enough in resources for no one or several to control price and quality
competition by overt collusion or by mutually regardful business policies. ''71
Given the astounding pace of economic centralization, 7  Tiedeman's original
concern to preserve enterprise from government intervention shifted to an at-
tempt to preserve the marketplace for small business. The view that, post its
initial pre-war investment in infrastructure, government non-intervention in the
economy was the best guarantee of development was replaced by the demand
for government intervention to ensure that small-scale enterprises could con-
tinue to function.
Although the early nineteenth century was described as the age of laissez-
faire by late nineteenth century legal scholars, including Holmes77  and
Tiedeman, 78 that is perhaps a more accurate description of its social and reli-
gious thought than its economic beliefs.79 Laissez-faire has not been considered
an apt description of antebellum economic thought at least since Willard Hurst,
more than thirty years ago, began to demonstrate that a more pragmatic ap-
proach to government intervention in the economy prevailed before the Civil
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. CHANDLER, supra note 58, at 285. By the turn of the century, "[i]n the sectors in which such large firms
moved, three to eight firms now commonly accounted for the bulk of trade," W. HuRsT. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 183 (1970).
75. Id.
76. According to CHANDLER, supra note 58, at 366, Table 9, by 1909, machinery, metals, petroleum, food
processing, rubber and tobacco were all industries in which from one- to three-quarters of total product value was
accounted for by oligopolistic production.
77. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 468 (1897) referring to the property-
protective legal doctrines of the fin de siecle as "new principles . . . discovered outside the ... [Constitution]
which may be generalized into acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years ago."
78. See Dictum and Decision, supra note 14, at 36 ("[Flifty or sixty years ago .... the popular opinion was
strongly against legislation which interfered with private business and the laissez-faire philosophy exerted the
dominant influence over public opinion in this country .... ").
79. Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 412 passim
(1988).
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War. 0 The thought of that period was at ease with the concept of government
as an engine of economic development, despite its opposition to federal regula-
tion."' Today the Jacksonian era is viewed as one in which government invest-
ment was eagerly sought for infrastructure expansion.82
Tiedeman shared that view and its rationale: The state had a responsibility
for the public good; it could, as guardian of the public welfare, undertake or
subsidize projects of improvement which would benefit the citizenry. Because
rights of ownership ultimately derived from the state,83 it had powers of emi-
nent domain to reclaim private property for public purposes and those powers
could be transferred into private hands. These special benefits to particular en-
trepreneurs or investors were in the nature of a government grant or franchise.
They created monopolies designed to promote general prosperity, but were not a
matter of right.8"
V. SEARCHING FOR THE LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENT
The above theory served when the aid of the state was required in develop-
ing the infrastructure of a growing nation before the Civil War. But in the post-
Civil War economic expansion, a theory of state-originated private property
posed the threat that democratic forces controlling state legislatures would im-
pose unacceptable conditions on further development. The Jacksonians, despite
their language in opposition to federal involvement in the economy, had in gen-
eral aggrandized the state role in that arena. A rationale was now required to
oust it.85 The initial attempt at ouster, now that government was becoming a
regulator, rather than an investor, retained the postulate of the propriety of
state intervention, but modified it with a doctrine of the inherent limitations of
majoritarian state action.8 1
80. W. HURST. LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED
STATES (1956); see also, 0. HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERN-
MENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (1947); L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEM-
OCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948).
81. "In the first three decades of the century, virtually every state and locality in the nation sought to aid the
economy by building roads and encouraging the construction of privately owned turnpikes," W. NELSON, supra
note 64, at 13.
82. See, e.g., C. GOODRICH. GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS, 1800-1890
(1960); H. SCHEIBER. THE OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1969); L.
MERCER. RAILROADS AND LAND GRANT POLICY: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION (1982).
83. "The absolute right of property being in the State, the right of ownership, which an individual may
acquire, must therefore, in theory at least, be held to be derived from the State, and the State has the right to
stipulate the conditions and terms upon which the land may be held by individuals." Tiedeman, What is Meant by
'Private Property in Land'?, 19 AM. L. REv. 878, 883 (1885).
84. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 303.
85. The "state power to create or regulate [monopolies was] challenged at various times under the commerce
clause, the contract clause, the article IV privileges and immunities clause, the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, the equal protection clause, the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause, the
thirteenth amendment, the patents clause of article I, section 8, the general theory that states had a finite 'police
power,' and the theory that no legislature could bind its successors in matters pertaining to public health or
welfare." Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Monopoly, 62 Tax. L. REV. 1263, 1281-82 (1984) (citations
omitted).
86. NELSON, supra note 64, at 45-48, stresses the extent to which antimajoritarian protection of property
rights was given intellectual support by the natural rights thinking of antislavery advocates.
1990]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A. The Formulation of the Police Power
The notion of the police power, originally broad, 87 became constrained in
the post-bellum period. Thus, says Tiedeman, in the Preface to the first edition
of the police power treatise, he has written to demonstrate that:
[u]nder the written constitutions, Federal and State, democratic absolutism is impossi-
ble in this country .... The substantial rights of the minority are shown to be free
from all lawful control or interference by the majority, except so far as ... may be
necessary to prevent injury to others in the enjoyment of their rights.88
The idea of a limited police power made room for the new doctrines of substan-
tive due process and liberty of contract to serve as the underlying rationales of
limitation. But it was not Tiedeman who applied these doctrines for their limit-
ing effect. Indeed, he was critical of them in his later writing, referring to them
as "technical rules of constitutional law which rest upon that fiction [of
equality]."89
Tiedeman never clarified his own view of where the limitations of the police
power were located within the Constitution. 0 While he says that "[T]he police
power of the government is shown to be confined to the detailed enforcment
[sic] of the legal maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas,"9' the reader
looks in vain for Tiedeman to demonstrate that this limitation occurs within the
letter of the Constitution. Instead, one reads that it is the unwritten law of the
country that restrains the exercise of the police power. 92 The closest Tiedeman
approached a constitutional derivation of police power limitations was in very
broadly locating the constitutional guarantee of freedom from state constraint
in the fifth and fourteenth amendment protections against deprivation of life,
liberty or property without due process. In the language that probably led
Twiss9" to conclude he was the apostle of liberty of contract, he says:
In searching for constitutional restrictions upon police power .... resort [may] be had
to ... those general clauses, which have acquired the name of 'glittering generalities,'
.... If, for example, a law should be enacted, which prohibited the prosecution of
some employment which did not involve the infliction of injury upon others, or which
restricts the liberty of the citizen unnecessarily, and in such a manner that it did not
violate any specific provision of the constitution, it may be held invalid, because in the
one case it interfered with the inalienable right of property, and in the other case, it
infringed upon the natural right to life and liberty.94
87. Judge Lemuel Shaw, who articulated the police power as the hitherto inchoate powers of state govern-
ments, described it as "the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances... not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth .... " Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85
(1851).
88. LPP, supra note 8, at vii.
89. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 423-24.
90. LPP, supra note 8, at vii.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Twiss, supra note 24, at 129.
94. LPP, supra note 8, at 10-11. But Tiedeman later makes clear that he does not believe there are any
natural rights, making the location of police power restraints even fuzzier. See infra text accompanying notes 115-
18.
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The limitations on deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
are, in effect, the limitations of the police power. "If these general constitutional
provisions contain the only limitations upon the legislative power to regulate
employments, in order to determine what are the specific limitations which
these provisions impose, it will be necessary to refer to the limitations upon the
police power."9 5
There is obviously some circularity here; the most one can say is that, writ-
ing in 1886, before the doctrine of the embedded constitutionality of liberty of
contract and substantive due process was fully developed, Tiedeman did not
claim that the Constitution clearly delineated that version of economic liberty
from restraint which would come to be used, in Lochner and elsewhere, as a bar
to legislative interference with the inexorable processes of the economy.
B. The "Scientific" View of the Police Power
In fact, Tiedeman's argument for the protection of private property is, in
the main, derived not from natural law, but from nature 8 That is to say,
Tiedeman believed that there was scientific support for the notion that private
property was an inherent necessity of human society. The inviolability of private
property, though an unwritten "generality," was part of the law of nature in a
scientific sense. For this proposition, Tiedeman found support in the work of
Herbert Spencer. Tiedeman's embrace of Darwinism in its Spencerian forms
was part of a general Gilded Age appeal to science as a source of first princi-
ples, both political and economic.
Spencer, through his own relentless self-promotion and lack of false mod-
esty,97 had become known as a foremost Social Darwinist, though in fact he first
floated his theory of intra-species competition in the human struggle for survival
eight years before the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859.9 Spencer's
claim was that forms of public organization, like the state, were remnants of a
lower stage in the development of the human species, when primitive collectiv-
ism was required.9 9 In the process of evolution, the species became stronger as
the struggle for survival killed off weaker specimens; the remaining individuals
were, or should be, ever less dependent on such social forms. Indeed, with fur-
ther adaptation, the species would cast off these forms entirely and social life
95. Id. at 195-96.
96. Nelson has suggested that, in the post-war period, it was no longer possible to rely on higher law thinking
to support the right to private property because that thinking, with the success of abolition, could be read equally
as protecting egalitarian principles. See, NELSON, supra note 64, particularly Chapter 3, "The Triumph and Fail-
ure of Antislavery and the Transformation of Federalism." For this reason, those concerned with the public wel-
fare turned to science to develop rationales for action. See id., Chapter 4, "The Quest for a Scientific Morality."
97. Spencer, in his autobiography, tells how his admirer George Eliot once asked why, though he thought so
much, his brow was unfurrowed. "I suppose it is because I am so rarely puzzled" he replied. I AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF HERBERT SPENCER 462 (1904), cited in W. IRVINE, APES, ANGELS AND VICTORIANS 29 (1955).
98. Spencer's SOCIAL STATICS: OR, THE COND1TIONS OF HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED. AND THE FIRST OF
THEM DEVELOPED was published in 1851; Darwin's THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION
in 1859.
99. For a fuller discussion of Spencer and his impact on American legal theory, see Hovenkamp, Evolution-
ary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEx. L REV. 645 (1985).
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would become quite private. Society would exist, but not the state.'0 0 Private
enterprise was a sign of this movement; capitalism signalled a higher stage of
human evolution than any to date. The opponents of private enterprise repre-
sented evolutionary failures, individuals unsuited to the bloody but inevitable
struggle for survival. State involvement in the economy in behalf of society's
weaker elements was retrogressive.' 0 '
Spencer, with his proposition that private property was an imperative prod-
uct of the laws of human evolution, provided intellectual respectability for
Tiedeman's claim that sic utere was a "fundamental rule" of human existence.
The reason each person had a right to property and had to respect the equal
right of others was because the evolution of the species required it. "[A]ny fur-
ther restraint is unwholesome," Tiedeman wrote.
10 2
The political version of Spencer's theory of social evolution was expressed
in his rule that "every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties
compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man."103 This is
quite clearly an adaptation of the old rule of sic utere and Tiedeman was will-
ing to accept it as such. All that with which the state cannot interfere is liberty,
for "liberty is that amount of personal freedom which is consistent with a strict
obedience to this rule" of sic utere.1
0 4
While this version of Spencer's formulation does not speak of freedom to
own or use property but merely to act, it nonetheless has a property-protective
character when put in context: Liberty, in its American version, becomes
equivalent to liberty of contract.' 0 5 In the second edition of the police power
work, 0 6 Tiedeman makes this equation clear by quoting the definition of liberty
from Allgeyer v. Louisiana,10 7 immediately after citing Spencer's definition.
That case was Justice Peckham's introduction to the Supreme Court of the
United States of the doctrine of liberty of contract as a tool to void state
regulation.
Enshrining liberty of contract as part of liberty gave a Spencerian "scien-
tific" derivation to the bounds between the exercise of the police power and the
freedom of the property owner to do as she will. Implicit in this version of the
100. Spencer "urged the elimination of public education, sanitation laws, and the public postal system."
Benedict, supra note 28, at 301. At the time, these proposals appeared extreme.
101. It was to this position of Spencer's that Holmes' famous comment in his dissent in Lochner was ad-
dressed: "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," 198 U.S. 45, 75. Holmes,
too, seems to have believed that social evolution rested on the struggle for survival among individuals: "The strug-
gle for life.., does not stop in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is equally the law of human existence."
Holmes, The Gas-Stokers' Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582, 583 (1873).
102. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 76.
103. H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 94 (1851), cited in LPP, supra note 8, at 67.
104. LPP, supra note 8, at 67.
105. Spencer later explicitly identified liberty with liberty of contract, but that was not until his 1891 work,
JusrIcE; see Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE .J. 454, 455 (1909).
106. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 76 n.l.
107. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). Justice Peckham there defined liberty as:
[N]ot only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint... but to be free in the enjoyment of
all his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may
be proper, necessary and essential to carry out ... the purposes above mentioned.
Id. at 589.
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sic utere principle, which speaks only of one's duties regarding the use of one's
property and the safeguarding of others', is that property owners owe no duties
to non-owners. Consequently, the police power is only available to order rela-
tions between property owners. The police power emphatically does not serve to
create a relation between property owners and non-property owners through the
state transferring power to, or serving as stand-in for, the latter. In essence, the
state can and should act as umpire among property owners through its exercise
of police power, and particularly between large and small property owners, but
the state is not to interfere between those who do and do not own property.
VI. TIEDEMAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY
With scientific sanction for the rule of sic utere, Tiedeman's answer to the
majoritarian dilemma was the formulation that the Constitution should be read
as limiting government action in respect to property to the exercise of the police
power to protect individual property owners from one another. It is that which
amounts to the public good. But popular acceptance of a Constitution that was
inherently property-protective rested on the public's belief that the self-regu-
lated economy operated fairly; Tiedeman believed economic concentration chal-
lenged this belief and, because popular opinion made the law, this threat was a
serious one.
A. The Organic Constitution
In The Unwritten Constitution, Tiedeman presented his claim that it was
the popular consensus that makes the law. The book was written when populist
sentiment was widespread in Missouri, a state well known for its hostility to
economic concentration, and seems to reflect the threat to the institutions of
private property which that sentiment posed.108 In lectures before the Missouri
State Bar Association in 1887, 1888 and 1889, published in book form in 1890
as The Unwritten Constitution, Tiedeman presented a conservative view of the
Constitution as protecting private property, but cautioned that such protection
could last only as long as popular sentiment favored it.
Tiedeman adopted a historicist approach to law as an evolving product of
human society. A legal rule is not the earthly expression of some Platonic code,
but "the product of social forces, reflecting the prevalent sense of right."109
Thus, what we call law requires not only the Austinian sovereign's power to
declare law, but the power to command public opinion toward its obedience.
Indeed, that power seems to him the central fact of sovereignty. "[S]ince all law
derives its binding authority from the present commands of those who now con-
trol and mould public opinion, and not from any original compact or consent of
the governed, the supreme power is in that aggregation of individuals, which
now has the ability to enforce obedience to its commands."110 The mere ability
108. See THELEN, supra note 12, at 205-65; PIOTT, supra note 12.
109. UC, supra note 8, at 9.
110. Id. at 125.
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to make law is not the ability to get it obeyed. "[T]he life of a rule of law is
derived from its habitual and spontaneous observance by the mass of people." 1 1
People acquiesce in the enforcement of laws because the "legal rule is ... fash-
ioned after the prevalent sense of right,"" 2 but "laws will cease to be enforced
as soon as public opinion, under the operation of social forces, undergoes a
change ... "I"
His rejection of law as the protector of natural rights, including the right of
property, is stark: the idea of natural rights is simply the unconscious product of
widespread social agreement as to what rights will be respected." 4 There are no
rights unrecognized by the popular will, "no such thing, even in ethics, as an
absolute, inalienable, natural right. The so-called natural rights depend upon,
and vary with, the legal and ethical conceptions of the people.""' 5 Thus, "there
is no fixed, invariable list of natural rights .... Indeed, the natural rights with
which all men are proclaimed . . . to be endowed by their Creator, have been
developed within the historical memory of man.""16 While Tiedeman now
wholly rejects the doctrine of natural rights (in contrast to his less absolute
1886 assertions regarding "human and ... natural law"""), he believes it is a
good thing that the Constitution uses natural rights language, because "the pop-
ular reverence for the written word""l 8 restrains challenge to the rights of prop-
erty contained therein. It is important to maintain that popular reverence be-
cause it is all that protects socially-created rights.
Although Tiedeman admitted he was at one time persuaded by Bentham
that law was made by judges," 9 he came to believe that courts and legislatures
neither make nor discover law; they mirror what the community wishes the law
to be:
[AIll law . . . whether it takes the form of statute or of judicial decision, is but an
expression of the popular sense of right .... [N]either the judge nor the legislator
makes living law, but only declares that to be the law, which has been forced upon
them, whether consciously or unconsciously, by the pressure of the popular sense of
right, that popular sense of right being itself but the resultant of the social forces
which are at play in every organized society.120
Even the Constitution is an organic document (hence the title, The Unwrit-
ten Constitution), and is understood as public opinion wishes it to be at any
particular time. Indeed, legislative intention is all but meaningless:
111. Id. at 6.
112. Id. at 7.
113. Id. at 121.
114. Id. at 6.
115. Id. at 76.
116. Id. at 73.
117. LPP, supra note 8, at 2. Although Tiedeman began the second edition of the police power treatise by
adverting to "the private rights of the individual ... [which] are natural rights, rights recognized and existing in
the law of reason" (1 SFC, supra note 8, at 1), in a footnote to that statement, he said that he was referring
merely to those "conceptions of natural rights which have by adjudications been embodied in American constitu-
tional law." I SFC, supra note 8 at n.l. For a "scientific" critique of natural rights theory, he refers the reader to
THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, where, he says, it is "properly recognized and discussed." Id.
118. UC, supra note 8, at 136.
119. Methods of Legal Education, supra note 13, at 154.
120. Id.
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[T]he judge or practitioner of the law, who would interpret the law right, i.e., ascer-
tain with precision the rule of conduct in any case, need not concern himself so much
with the intentions of the framers ... as with the modifications of the written word by
the ... present will of the people. 12'
Judicial review then is essentially the task of understanding not what the legis-
lature intended, but "what the popular will intends by the written word. '122
Consequently, the idea that the protection of private property is embedded in
the Constitution is safe only so long as society accepts it.
Tiedeman uses the evolution of the contract clause as an example of his
point that the constitutional guarantees of private property are not fixed and
certain, but changing. The public accepted, even desired, the protection afforded
private initiative by the legislative restraint John Marshall read into the con-
tract clause in Dartmouth College.' 23 But that decision restrained public im-
provements as well and had to be modified. Thus, in the Charles River Bridge
case, "[t]he public pressure in favor of the second bridge was so great"'' 24 that
the Court decided the legislative grant of a second franchise would not be an
impairment of contract. The meaning of the contract clause itself changed be-
cause public need and public opinion required the change. There was "a change
in public opinion, and a consequent change in the constitutional rule.' 25
B. The Antimajoritarian Constitution
Tiedeman is not arguing simply that the Constitution has a preference for
dynamic uses of property over static ones; he is making the more difficult point
that the Constitution is indeterminate. This rather modern view of the Constitu-
tion was not an optimistic one; such a Constitution was itself at the mercy of
political majorities, not a bulwark against them. The protection of private prop-
erty required that public opinion be recognized and afforded deference. "Of
what value then," Tiedeman asks, "is a written constitution?" And answers,
"[T]he real value of the written constitution . . . [is that i]t legalizes, and
therefore makes possible and successful, the opposition to the popular will."' 26
In other words, it creates a judiciary:
[Aill these checks and balances, set down in a written constitution, would be unavail-
ing, if the means of securing their observance were not likewise provided in the exalted
and extraordinary power of the courts to declare when a law, passed by the Congress,
or an act, committed by an official, is in contradiction of some provision of the
Constitution.127
This is a peculiar view of the Constitution; it is a document that is interpreted
as public opinion understands it, but it also provides a means to withstand pub-
lic opinion.
121. UC, supra note 8, at 151.
122. Id. at 153.
123. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); UC, supra note 8, at 55-56.
124. UC, supra note 8, at 57.
125. Id. at 66.
126. Id. at 163.
127. Id. at 159.
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C. Stare Decisis as a Limitation on Majorities
The instability inherent in this view of the Constitution later led Tiedeman
to support a form of codification as a means of fixing the law beyond the power
of majorities. Even the judiciary was too willing to bow to public opinion. Suc-
cessful opposition to the popular will required, he believed, some limitations on
judicial discretion. An 1896 paper read to the New York State Bar Associa-
tion128 used stare decisis as the starting point of an examination of ways to limit
the judiciary.
Stare decisis makes some sense because it is founded "in the intense and
just desire to secure uniformity and certainty in the enforcement and applica-
tion of the law."' 2 9 Why has stare decisis "acquired such a mastery over the
Anglo-Saxon juridicial mind, that it excludes everything else except statutes,
from consideration as ... law?"1  Tiedeman gives an answer worthy of any
Realist:
The rule of Stare Decisis ... serves the purpose of protecting vested interests against
any popular attacks exerted through a change of judicial opinion .... The protection
to vested interests and the ascertainment of certainty in the administration of the law
are held to be paramount to the ascertainment of absolute right and justice in the
particular case."'
He saves himself from radicalism by claiming that "vested interests are and
have been more seriously threatened among Anglo-Saxon peoples by the onward
march of Democracy than among other peoples.' 2 Thus, in English-speaking
countries, the concern for vested interests over "absolute right and justice"' 33 is
justified. "So far as the doctrine of Stare Decisis serves the purpose of a brake
on the wheels of democracy, with its socialistic and other more or less revolu-
tionary demands for change, it is a precious heritage of the common law, and
should be jealously guarded against destruction or abrogation."114
But is stare decisis the only means to this end? "[T]he answer to that ques-
tion cannot be so certain ... when we remember that in no other jurisprudence,
known to mankind, was the same importance and effect given to judicial utter-
ances.""135 The problem with stare decisis is that it does too much. It enshrines
merely personal reasoning of judges as part of the law, when in fact it is only
the ruling which is law. What is really needed is that judges be "charged with
the duty of formulating a scientific, and hence comparatively exact, analysis
and exposition of the law, as it has been evolved in the course of actual litiga-
tion out of the national will. '""6 This is not, he says, a recommendation for
128. Stare Decisis, supra note 14, at 103.
129. Id. at 107.
130. Id. at 112.
131. Id. at 113.
132. Id. at 114.
133. Id. at 113.
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id. at 109.
136. Id. at 121.
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codification, but rather for "[an] official analysis and exposition of the law,"' 37
and should be the product of:
[a] commission, composed of the ablest jurists of the State... who shall be charged
with the reduction of the existing law to the form of commentaries on the different
branches of the law, and ... to issue annuals, in which the judgments of the courts
during the current year will be analytically explained in the light of their exposition of
the existing law, and the modification stated, if any, which the new case has made in
the prior law.' s
In other words, something like the Restatements. In light of his earlier formula-
tions that law is made by popular agreement and that those who create agree-
ment create the law, the call for a codification must be seen as an essentially
antimajoritarian attempt to retain the power to create agreement and eliminate
contingency, at a time when public hostility seemed to endanger property rights.
D. Preserving Private Property in a Majoritarian State
As demonstrated by his view of the Constitution and his call for codifica-
tion, Tiedeman was obviously troubled that the law was contingent upon public
opinion, for it meant property rights depended on a potentially fickle social con-
sensus.'3 9 While he did not believe that fundamental rights were derived from
natural law, the character of the rights fundamental to the well-being of the
polity remained the same: "[F]reedom from all legal restraint that is not needed
to prevent injury to others,"' 4 a doctrine Tiedeman derived from Spencer, the
Magna Carta and American constitutions, state and federal,' 4 ' is the key. But
the public consensus supporting the fundamental right of freedom from re-
straint is endangered:
Under the stress of economical relations, the clashing of private interests, the conflicts
of labor and capital, the old superstition that government has the power to banish evil
from the earth, if it could only be induced to declare the supposed causes illegal, has
been revived; and all these so-called natural rights, which the framers of our constitu-
tions declared to be inalienable.., are in imminent danger of serious infringement. 42
A consensus theorist, Tiedeman rejected the supernatural framework of natural
law, but then faced the problem of the protection of the institutions he most
valued when the consensus began to disintegrate. Tiedeman's answer was that
the demand for change springs from the growth of great concentrations of capi-
tal-an unsatisfactory situation that needs to be corrected.
[A]n unmistakable, and general and popular condemnation of the strong and appar-
ently irresistible tendency to the concentration of capital, and of the gigantic economic
137. Id. at 127.
138. Id. at 128.
139. In this, Tiedeman reflected the views of his mentor, von Jhering, who had written: "There is no absolute
property, i.e., property that is freed from taking into consideration the interest of the community, and history has
taken care to inculcate this truth in all peoples." R VON JHERING, DER GEISr DES RMISCHEN RIGHTs RECHTs AUF
DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWiCKLING (4th ed. 1978), cited in Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The
Search for a New Definition of Property, 1 ILL L REv. 41 (1986).
140. UC, supra note 8, at 76.
141. Id. at 76-78.
142. Id. at 79.
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power which such concentration creates .. .seems to me to explain the real force
which is back of the anti-trust legislation, and without whose support the socialistic
propaganda could not get a hearing. '43
VII. CONCENTRATION AND MONOPOLY
The property Tiedeman was interested in preserving was precisely private
property, that is, the property of individuals. He had argued for the limitation
of the police power only as it applied to the regulation of small business, what
he called "trades and professions.' 44 The forces of economic concentration
threatened small business, both directly by making it uneconomic, and indi-
rectly by arousing opposition among the propertyless to the very institution of
property. A growing dissatisfaction with economic concentration could lead to a
threat to property generally. Nationalization of one form of property was neces-
sary to protect the institution of private property itself. This is the underpinning
of his apparently paradoxical belief that government takeover of big business
was needed to restrain socialism.
A. Privileged and Virtual Monopoly
In Tiedeman's view, monopoly had two faces-the "legal franchise or mo-
nopoly, acquired by enactment of the legislature . . ." and the "particular trade
or calling . . . so circumstanced as to amount to a virtual monopoly .... ,,145
The former was a creature of the state, the latter of private enterprise; the
former was a privilege granted by the state and could be regulated, even to the
point of taking, the latter, simply property, should be free of regulation. 146 As to
what constituted a public franchise, and thus a regulable monopoly, Tiedeman's
view was broad. As a theoretician of the smallholders, Tiedeman's great enemy
was the monopoly created by government. Most monopolies were the product of
dishonesty or privilege, 4 7 including the privilege of incorporation. "It is only in
extraordinary abnormal cases that any one man can acquire this power [of mo-
nopoly] over his fellow-men, unless he is the recipient of a privilege from the
government, or is guilty of dishonest practices.' 48
The privilege to create a monopoly may be granted by the state in the
exercise of its police power, that is to say, for the public good, but it can also be
143. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 407. Tiedeman seems to have used the word "socialistic" as the economist
Francis Walker did: "I should apply the term 'socialistic' to all efforts, under popular impulse, to enlarge the
functions of government, to the diminution of individual enterprise, for a supposed public good," F. Walker, 2
Discussions in Economics and Statistics 250 (1899), cited in Benedict, supra note 28, at 306.
144. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 239.
145. Tiedeman, Police Regulations of Trade Combination, 2 INTERCOLL LJ. 109, 110 (1894).
146. See Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility
Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984), for a clear discussion of the distinction between property and privi-
lege in nineteenth-century liberal economic thought and the jurisprudential consequences of the distinction.
147. The view that "[o]nly criminal activity or legal privilege enabled enterprises to achieve market domi-
nance" was generally characteristic of nineteenth-century liberal economic theory. Siegel, supra note 146, at 191.
148. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 354. In State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 811-12 (1892), the court,
citing to the first edition of the police power treatise, quoted this language in upholding the power of the legisla-
ture to protect miners by prohibiting mining corporations from paying their employees in scrip.
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retracted when the public good demands it. The monopoly business created by
privilege might be hemmed about, in ways that other kinds of businesses would
not be. "A special privilege or franchise is granted to individuals because of
some supposed benefit to the public, and in order that the benefit may be as-
sured to the public, the State may justly institute regulations to that end." 149
But the same logic does not apply to natural, or what he calls "virtual,"
monopolies when it comes to the ability of the state to regulate them. "[TIhe
State can, and indeed it is its duty to, subject to police control a monopoly,
created by law .... [But this does not] justify the application of [this] rule...
to a business, which is a virtual monopoly, but is not made so by law."'150 A
business which can be operated without state concession (in essence, without
incorporation)"'5 is not subject to regulation, regardless of whether it is a mo-
nopoly. Police regulation ought not to be allowed where "no special privilege or
franchise is enjoyed, and in which there is no legal monopoly, but in which the
circumstances conspire to create in favor of a few persons a virtual monopoly
out of a business of supreme necessity to the public."'' And the mere declara-
tion by the legislature that the prosecution of a business is a privilege is not
enough to justify regulation. "If it be without legislation a natural right, no law
can make it a privilege by requiring a license. The deprivation of the natural
right to carry on the business must be justifiable by some public reason or ne-
cessity." 153 Small business has the right to operate unregulated since it does not
owe its existence to government grant or fiat.
In Tiedeman's view, which was derived from the tradition of the common
law as it had been received in America, 5 4 the corporate form was not a natural
one, but a creation of the law, and thus quasi-public. "[T]he very creation of
the corporation ... may be considered a special franchise.' 55 Writing before
Santa Clara,"" he argued that the "rights and powers of a corporation depend
altogether upon the will of the legislature"'157 and that corporations are not
equivalent to individuals in their freedom from regulation. Corporations, which
require legislative charter, are the creatures of a privilege which may be with-
drawn or modified where the public requires it. 5 8
149. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 303.
150. Id. at 299-300.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 202-06.
152. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 304.
153. Id.
154. "Our legal tradition began by regarding corporate status as uniquely created by the sovereign's action
and existing strictly on the sovereign's terms." HuRsr, supra note 74, at 156.
155. 2 SFC, supra note 8, at 977.
156. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), was the case in which the Supreme
Court of the United States announced that for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, corporations were to be
considered persons, rather than creations of the state. They had the rights of persons and could not, without due
process, be deprived of them.
157. LPP, supra note 8, at 354.
158. The distinction, in Jacksonian legal thought, between ordinary property and that created by privilege,
grant or franchise is discussed in Siegel, supra note 146, at 189-93, as well as Siegel, Understanding the Nine-
teenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and 'Takings' Clause Jurispru-
dence, 60 S. CAL L. REV. 1, 55 passim (1986). "Property . . . stood in contrast to privilege, which signified
wealth that only certain individuals could acquire, usually through designation by affirmative governmental act,"
Id. at 58.
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His favored position, even after Santa Clara, remained that corporations
were not wholly private, if they received public support in the form of eminent
domain or franchises. When a grant of a special privilege or franchise is neces-
sary to the conduct of a business, it could be regulated in ways non-privileged
enterprises or individuals could not:
Whenever the business is itself a privilege or franchise, not enjoyed by all alike, or the
business is materially benefited by the gift by the State of some special privileges to be
enjoyed in connection with it, the business ceases to be strictly private, and becomes a
quasi public business, and to that extent may be subjected to police regulation. 1 9
1. Munn
Thus Tiedeman was opposed to the Munn'160 doctrine that individual non-
privileged businesses could be regulated when "clothed with the public inter-
est."1 6 The Munn case, he recognized, implied a public interest in private prop-
erty sans any affirmative act of the state.
There was no particular franchise involved, yet the Supreme Court held that because
[the owners of grain elevators] had it in their power to compel people to pay what they
were pleased to charge, the state had the right to institute regulations of the price of
storage .... To my mind it constitutes a landmark in legal history."'
The Munn doctrine was dangerous: "Under this rule, the attainment of the
object of all individual activity, viz.: to make oneself or one's services indispen-
sable to the public, furnishes in every case the justification of State interference.
Only the more or less unsuccessful will be permitted to enjoy his liberty without
governmental molestation.' 6 3 The logical extension of Munn would be that the
state could never be ousted as a regulator of successful business, whether or not
the business had obtained state subsidy, so long as the business could be defined
as one clothed with the public interest.
Tiedeman relied upon the limitations of the police power as a brake on
state regulation, rather than whether an enterprise was or was not affected with
a public interest.'64 The overarching principle was that the affirmative interven-
tion of the government on behalf of a business meant it had no fundamental
right to autonomy. A subsidized business could be regulated, an unsubsidized
one could not. The deciding factor was not the existence of the monopoly, but
159. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 303.
160. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
161. Id. at 126.
162. Trade Combination, supra note 145, at 111.
163. LPP, supra note 8, at 235. Tiedeman's in terrorem argument against the Munn doctrine is its possible
extension to wages:
One would be likely to think that, if it was lawful for the State to regulate the rate of charges, which an
elevator owner may charge for the storage of grain, because the elevator, on account of the necessities of
the shipper, was a virtual monopoly; it would be equally lawful for the State to regulate the rate of all
wages, by establishing a minimum rate of wages, because work is necessary to the life of the workman and
his family, and the possession of capital makes the capitalist or employer a virtual monopolist.
1 SFC, supra note 8, at 317.
164. Not until Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531 (1934), did the Court decide that "affected with a
public interest" meant, in essence, subject to the exercise of the police power.
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how it came into being. Here, he locates himself between, on the one hand,
Justices Miller and Waite, who wrote the Slaughterhouse Cases and Munn re-
spectively, representatives of old ways of thinking about the dominant role of
government in the economy, 65 and Justice Field, on the other, who dissented in
both cases, 6 ' in what is considered a fashion representative of the new attitude
toward economic growth free of government support or interference. 167
Tiedeman supported Miller and Waite in the Slaughterhouse Cases and Field
in Munn. On the one hand, when the public good required it, the state could
create an artificial monopoly, as Louisiana had by restricting the locations in
which animals could be slaughtered, and, more to the point, could regulate it;
on the other hand, a naturally-occurring monopoly, like Munn's grain elevators,
should remain free of state control. 68
2. Slaughterhouse
Tiedeman believed that the Slaughterhouse Cases were rightly decided,
although he, as much as Field, believed in the right of individuals to pursue any
lawful calling, unhampered by government intervention.' 69  Field has been
viewed in Slaughterhouse as applying Jacksonian principles of natural rights
and individual liberties to the economic questions of the late nineteenth cen-
tury. 170 But Field did so as a proponent of an expanding economy, rather than,
like Tiedeman, as a representative of a constituency to whom the expansion of
the national economy was less important than retaining their place within it.
Although Field's position in the Slaughterhouse Cases lent support to the
butchers, and Tiedeman's to the corporation that was the beneficiary of state
regulation, the consequence of the adoption of Field's position was, in the long
run, the aggrandizement of the corporate sphere at the expense of the individual
entrepreneur.
165. On Miller, see G. WwTa, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 87-91 (1976); on Waite's opinion in
Munn, see Siegel, supra note 146, at 195-99.
166. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 83 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting); Munn, 94 U.S. at 136
(Field, J., dissenting).
167. Horwitz, supra note 25, at 684.
168. It is worth noting that Tiedeman's support for the economic principles implicit in the Slaughterhouse
decision was shared by the laissez-faire oriented magazine The Nation, which feared, as Tiedeman did, that a
contrary outcome would insulate special privilege from government control. The Nation 11 (Dec. 1, 1870), cited
in R KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 162 (1985); but see Siegel, supra note 146, at 203 n.3, noting the opposition
of Herbert Croly, The Natton's editor, to Justice Waite's reasoning in Munn.
169. Tiedeman's adherence to the decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases was also based on his notion that the
framers of the fourteenth amendment did not fully understand the extent to which it magnified federal power and,
had they understood that, would have written it differently. The "bold and courageous" action of the Court in that
case was necessary to avert a "disastrous result," UC, supra note 8, at 102.
If the constitutional amendment had been allowed to have its full literal effect, the end obtained would be
. . . the establishment of a strong national government and the subjection of the States to the condition of
provinces . . . . Feeling assured that the people in their cooler moments would not have sanctioned the
far-reaching effects of their action, .. the court dared to withstand the popular will as expressed in the
letter of this amendment.
Id. at 101-03. The Court's action here, he concluded, "furnishes one of the most striking proofs of the thesis, that
political constitutions are a growth, evolved from all forces of society, both material and spiritual." Id. at 107.
170. McCurdy, supra note 67, at 973.
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Tiedeman, a proponent of the freedom of individuals from regulation, did
not find it easy to explain his opposition to the butchers' position in the
Slaughterhouse Cases:
[I]t is not difficult to determine on principle that the grant of privileges not other-
wise acquirable may be made a monopoly, but that a monopoly cannot be made of the
ordinary lawful occupations. The difficulty becomes almost inexplicable, when the ex-
clusive privilege is granted of carrying on a business, which is prohibited to others,
because the unlimited pursuit of it works an injury to society.17 1
But he was able to clarify his position in his last article:
[It may happen that a trade or business is inimical to the public welfare only when it
is left open to all who may choose to follow it; and that the menace to the interests of
the commonwealth may be eliminated by the prohibition of such trade or business to
individuals, and the grant to a few of the exclusive right to carry on the trade or
business as a statutory monopoly.17
Concretely, his support of the Louisiana legislation was based on the tradi-
tional police power doctrine that a lawful business may nonetheless be regulated
as to location. "[W]here the public interests require it, ordinary callings and
businesses may be converted into more or less exclusive monopolies the
same principle applies to those cases, where the law provides that a particular
trade shall be conducted in certain buildings or localities.' 73 If the state, for
example, may declare that markets can only be conducted in a public market
building, it can authorize a private individual or corporation to maintain the
market. "The monopoly, thus created, is not any more objectionable on princi-
ple, because it does not interfere to any greater degree, or in any different way,
with the liberties of others who are prohibited, than the erection and mainte-
nance of such buildings by the government."'' 74 Thus:
If the State has the constitutional power to prohibit the prosecution of such a trade in
all other buildings, the prohibition is equally irksome, whether the [permitted] build-
ings are owned by the public or by private individuals; and the grant of the right to
prosecute an otherwise prohibited trade in the buildings of a private individual or cor-
poration would create a privilege, and may therefore be made a monopoly.' 75
In such a case, what has been created "is not a common natural right because it
cannot be prosecuted without the aid of a legal privilege.'1 76
His support for the Slaughterhouse decision was not backing for govern-
ment creation of monopolies, but for government control and regulation of mo-
nopolies created by privilege. "[T]he grant of the franchise makes the corpora-
tions legal monopolies, as against the public, and consequently they become
subject to police regulation, in order to protect the public from extortion."' 77
That protection could include government takeover. A monopoly acquired by
one's own successful efforts is not restrainable, but where the government cre-
171. I SFC, supra note 8, at 573.
172. Government Ownership, supra note 17, at 477.
173. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 578-79.
174. Id. at 579.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 562.
177. 2 SFC, supra note 8, at 274-76.
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ates a monopoly by a grant or franchise for a public purpose, it may, of course,
regulate it. And the government can take over the monopoly where its retention
in private hands is at cross-purposes with the public interest.
B. Government Takeover of Privileged Monopolies
It was precisely from the constitutional objections to grants of monopolies
that Tiedeman derived the justification for takeover. There were two such objec-
tions, he reasoned. First, the grant of a monopoly violates the liberty of contract
of individuals foreclosed from a particular enterprise by the grant to another.
Second, the grant amounts to anti-competitive governmental largesse to a par-
ticular citizen to the exclusion of others and thus violates the constitutional
guaranty of equal privileges and immunities for all citizens.
The first objection he answered in his defense of the Slaughterhouse deci-
sion, saying that a grant in aid of a business which could not be otherwise con-
ducted violated no one's liberty to undertake the business. Without the grant, no
business existed. But the second objection was more compelling. Why should a
government privilege like the grant of eminent domain be given to a few indi-
viduals who are thus advantaged in the economic competition?
Granted that individual capitalists cannot be allowed indiscriminately and without re-
straint to exercise the right of eminent domain, and to tear up the streets of a city in
order to lay down conduits, pipes, and tracks; it does not necessarily follow that the
right to do these things should be granted as a private monopoly to a few persons or
corporations.1 7
8
Of course, "[i]f there was no other alternative to the creation of such private
monopolies but the denial of these conveniences and necessities to the people,
the law of overruling necessity would amply justify this patent and unmistaka-
ble violation of our constitutional guaranty of equal privileges and
immunities." 179
However, there is another very feasible alternative. "It is this: whatever
business or industry cannot be left open to the free choice of all persons without
favor or discrimination . . . should and can be made a government monopoly,
instead of being granted to private individuals or corporations." 180
This might have happened in the early Republic, but public opinion was
not ready for it. The expansion of the American economy, particularly with
respect to transportation and communications, he says, "arose at a time when
the laissez-faire philosophy was in complete ascendancy, when the popular
mind would have been startled by the proposition that the government should
178. Government Ownership, supra note 17, at 481. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the
Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAw IN AMERICAN HISToRY 329, 360-73 passim (B. Bailyn &
D. Fleming ed. 1971), has pointed out the extent to which eminent domain powers indeed amounted to a subsidy
to individual entrepreneurs who prospered by providing infrastructural development with the aid of the grant of
that power. At the same time, the undoubted public benefit derived from subsidies to private enterprise destabi-
lized the notion of strict egalitarianism in the relation of government to its citizens.
179. Government Ownership, supra note 17, at 481.
180. Id.
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embark in the business of railroading."181 Thus, rather than the government
taking land for public use, "[t]he legal profession came to the rescue and sug-
gested that 'public use' must be interpreted, in determining the limitations of
the right of eminent domain, as meaning 'public good' or 'public purpose'; and
the railroad was declared to be a quasi-public corporation."1 82
The constitutional pledge of equality depends on the government not favor-
ing one person over another; that can only be assured by making necessary mo-
nopolies government owned. "There is only one way whereby the seeming equal-
ity of all men may be established in these conspicuous cases of governmental
favoritism to the stronger; and that is, the conversion of all of these necessary
monopolies from private into government monopolies." 183 The government grant
which creates a private, but necessary, monopoly amounts to unequal favoring
of one citizen over another; if the public good requires a monopoly, the public
should own it. Going to what is for him the heart of the matter, the interests of
smallholders, he says that government grants threaten small-scale enterprise
and policymakers should take that into account:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States extols the idea of preserving from extinc-
tion the small tradesman, artisan, and manufacturer, and the consequent limitation of
the concentration of large wealth into the hands of a few. But can this judicial and
legislative attitude be reconciled with the grant to private individuals and corporations
of valuable franchises by which they are enabled to accumulate vast fortunes in sup-
plying the necessities of the people?
184
It was of no concern to him that concentration resulted in economies of scale
that could reduce costs to consumers. Like the "old conservative" majority on
the Supreme Court, 85 his constituency was smallholders, not the growing class
of employee-consumers. It is not the proper goal of courts or legislatures:
that the prices of products should be reduced at the expense of the liberty of the
individual to pursue a lawful calling; ... [but] it is the concern of the government,
which is manifested by the legislation against trusts and trade combinations, that the
small tradesman, manufacturer and artisan, shall not be driven to the wall, overpow-
ered by the giant combinations. 8
181. Id. at 478. This, of course, now appears historically inaccurate; see supra text accompanying notes 80-
82.
182. Id. at 478 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 483.
184. Id. at 482.
185. See, Horwitz, supra note 25, at 686.
The opinion of the Court in the United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897), written
by Justice Peckham, sounded themes with which Tiedeman could not but agree; according to the Court, the nation
suffered when combination "depriv[ed] it of the services of a large number of small but independent dealers ....
[It was] not for the real prosperity of any country that such changes should occur which result in transferring an
independent business man, the head of his establishment, small though it might be, into a mere servant or agent of
a corporation .... " Id. at 324.
Peckham shared Tiedeman's view that there was an important difference between pro- and anti-competitive
combinations of capital, and argued that the latter were in restraint of trade. Id. at 323-24. The dissent in the case
criticized Peckham's position as a blow to liberty of contract. Id. at 355 (White, J., dissenting). It was Peckham
who had first used the doctrine of liberty of contract to strike down state legislation in the Supreme Court the
previous year in Allgeyer. See supra text accompanying note 107.
186. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 611. Tiedeman also urged that courts could not coherently utilize the individu-
alist doctrine of liberty of contract to restrict legislative interference with business without also being willing to
restrain monopolies:
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Opponents may urge, Tiedeman says, that nationalization will lead to so-
cialism. In fact, takeover of monopolies will block socialism:
The socialistic antipathy which is now so prevalent to the appropriation by private
capitalists of any of the profits of labor, as labor agitators estimate and describe them,
and which is so powerful a lever for the creation of discontent in the case of private
employment, would then be absent, inasmuch as the profits of the business of rail-
roads, telegraphs, electric and gas-light plants, etc., would then be taken by the gov-
ernment for the benefit of the whole people.
18 7
The answer to the demand for socialism, the way to preserve a competitive capi-
talist economy, is for the government to take over big business and its profits.
No doubt many were taken aback by this conclusion.
Tiedeman's call for nationalization was not simply a product of the tensions
of the nineties. In the eighties, while in Missouri, he had apparently lent some
support to the movement for state control of public utilities by refusing to de-
scribe as unconstitutional the proposal that municipal governments operate pub-
lic utilities. 88 In the first edition of the police power treatise published in 1886,
Tiedeman had suggested that the Supreme Court would find it "a legitimate
assumption of power for the United States to make a government monopoly of
the management of railroads and the telegraph, and appropriate to its use the
existing lines of railroad and telegraph."8 9 His justification then was that it was
likely to prove a way of controlling "collision[s] between the capitalist and the
workingman."'' 90 And he preempted criticism by arguing that such nationaliza-
tion would not be a model for redistributive "attempts ... to create monopolies
out of trades and occupations, the prosecution of which by private individuals
and corporations would not necessarily inflict injury upon the public."' 91
These themes, tentative and unformed at the outset, more urgent at the
close, remain consistent from 1886 to 1903; they reflect the smallholder's re-
sponse to the concentration and oligopoly of the post-war period and, in their
development, suggest that Tiedeman had concluded at a relatively early date
that there was no way to block the expansion of big capital except through big
government. The nineteenth-century liberal language of property rights, which
drew distinctions between that which was earned, property, and that which was
granted, privilege, supported the conclusion that the latter could be national-
ized, not for redistributive purposes, but to protect the former.
It is certainly a case of judicial inconsistency to deny to the legislature the right to interfere with the
liberty of contract of the individual for the purpose of regulating the price of wages and goods, and at the
same time to increase the natural power of control which the capitalist, by the mere possession of his
capital, already has over the rest of his fellow-citizens, by granting to him a privilege or franchise to
supply a common and universal necessity.
Government Ownership, supra note 17, at 482.
187. Id. at 490.
188. These proposals were controversial ones which excited Missouri public opinion in the late eighties.PsorT,
supra note 12, at 21-26. According to Tiedeman, he was criticized by other lawyers for his stand on this issue.
Dictum and Decision, supra note 14, at 36.
189. LPP, supra note 8, at 326.
190. Id. at 327.
191. Id.
1990] 1375
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VIII. COMPETITION
Though he supported the regulation of combinations, cartels and trusts,
Tiedeman did not consider regulation of the marketplace a sufficient substitute
for takeover. Antitrust laws do too much; they bar both combinations which
restrict competition and those which preserve it. Most antitrust statutes he re-
garded as "ill-considered and poorly constructed legislation on a problem which
reaches so deep down into the mysteries of human desires, and which is so com-
pletely within the control of the inexorable laws of nature, and the social
forces."192
A. Competition Among Businesses
Tiedeman explained these inexorable antitrust laws at length in the second
edition of the police power treatise.9 3 Some combinations of businesses preserve
competition by preventing the strongest or most daring among them from seiz-
ing the field.
[W]here there is no... purpose to create a monopoly, but only the lawful purpose of
putting an end to litigation of rival corporations over their conflicting interests, the
consolidation of the corporations is not illegal, as tending to create a monopoly, partic-
ularly, when the corporations hold no public franchise, like a railroad, and their output
comprises but a small portion of the same product ..... 11
This sort of combination is pro-competitive, while trustification is clearly anti-
competitive. 95
But both pro- and anti-competitive combinations are banned by an inter-
pretation of antitrust laws as barring all contracts in restraint of trade. Such
laws reveal the "general and popular condemnation of the strong and appar-
ently irresistible tendency to the concentration of capital and of the gigantic
economic power which such combination creates."' 19 6 However:
[T]o be effective in restraining the growth and enlargement of combinations of capital,
[anti-trust statutes] must be so reconstructed as to remove their present antagonism to
economic and industrial necessities [pro-competitive combinations]; or these necessities
themselves must be changed by new inventions and the discovery of new methods of
manufacture of business, whereby it becomes possible for the small dealer and manu-
facturer to sell his goods and products to the consumer as cheaply as can the large
dealer and manufacturer.197
The real solution is not antitrust laws, but government takeover and limits
on incorporation. Tiedeman came to oppose the corporate form itself which had,
192. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 465.
193. Chapter IX, Regulation of Trades and Occupations, which dealt with the problems of competition and
concentration in the economy, grew from 134 pages in LPP, the first edition of the police power treatise, to 380 in
SFC, the second.
194. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 406-07.
195. Id. at 382-87.
196. Id. at 407.
197. Id. at 407-08.
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by then, lost its character as a creation of the state,198 or at least to urge its
severe constraint:
[A]ll attempts to suppress and prevent combinations in restraint of trade must neces-
sarily prove futile, as long as the statutes of the State permit the creation of private
corporations, for the prosecution of businesses, which can be successfully carried on by
private individuals without the aid of a charter of incorporation .... I advocate, as a
return to a uniform recognition of the constitutional guarantee of equality before the
law, the repeal of statutes which provide for the creation of private corporations.199
The maintenance of a competitive economy, he believed, required denying the
right of free incorporation, for it was that which led to giant combinations. 200
The long-term remedy for anti-competitive monopolization was for much nar-
rower incorporation laws that "limit the capital and volume of business of a
corporation.1 20 1 Businesses like banks and insurance companies, which, because
of capital requirements, could only be operated as corporations, should be taken
over by government whether monopolies or not °. 20  But any business which could
be operated without incorporation could not be nationalized:
I do not desire to be understood as justifying the creation of a government monopoly
in a case, in which the individual cannot in his individual capacity successfully conduct
the business on so large a scale as it is now being managed under a charter of incorpo-
ration. If the business can be successfully conducted by a private individual on a
smaller scale, and with a reasonable protection to parties having dealing with him...
that business cannot be converted into a government monopoly, without infringing the
constitutional right of the individual to pursue any lawful calling he may select.20 3
Opposition to incorporation is Tiedeman's response to monopolies which
arise from forces which are difficult to identify with government intervention.0 4
His answer is that these monopolies, too, are a consequence of government
grant - even if not by virtue of eminent domain or some other concededly
positive act, the mere act of incorporation is tantamount to a government grant
creating a monopoly:
198. By the 1840s and 1850s, general incorporation acts were on the rise as part of a response to government
subsidies for economic development. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) for the
list. General incorporation laws were precisely a Jacksonian response to the complaint that legislative chartering
had led to unequal distribution of government benefits. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 64, at 14; Horwitz, supra
note 25, at 684. It was the ease of incorporation which Tiedeman opposed, not the aim.
199. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 609-10.
200. Id. at 609-11.
201. Id. at 392.
202. Id. at 610.
203. Id.
204. According to CHANDLER, supra note 58, at 376, the forces responsible for economic concentration in the
late nineteenth century were "fundamental changes in processes of production and distribution made possible by
the availability of new sources of energy and by the increasing application of scientific knowledge to industrial
technology.... [The process was] little affected by public policy." See also, R. ROaERTsON, HIsTORY OF THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 346-47 (3d ed. 1973), arguing that technological advances led businesses to overproduce,
hence necessitating combination in order to reduce output. Hovenkamp, supra note 85, at 1273 passim. Pursuant
to this view, the majority of monopolies are, in Tiedeman's language, virtual monopolies, rather than creations of
the state. Recognition was probably what led Tiedeman to argue that incorporation could be viewed as the act of
privilege by which monopolies were created. Since no large-scale business could, by the turn of the century, be
operated without incorporation, all large-scale business could by this definition be brought within the category of
regulable, and hence, takable industries.
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I insist that the grant of a charter of incorporation of a bank or of an insurance com-
pany is as much a grant of a special privilege or franchise, in violation of the constitu-
tional guaranty of equal privileges and immunities, as is the grant of a charter to a
railroad or street railway company. Assuming it to be true that banking and insur-
ance, or either of them, cannot be successfully conducted by natural persons without
the aid of incorporation, the only method of providing for such businesses, which is
consonant with democratic principles of equality, is by their conversion into govern-
ment monopolies. 2
05
The aggregation of capital necessary for these enterprises would be impossible
sans the statutory privilege of general incorporation, hence, one can consider
them, as much as any grant of the right to build a bridge, the product of gov-
ernment sanction. Here, Tiedeman sounds once again like a Jacksonian whose
response to concentrations of capital is to insist that they owe their existence to
government privilege which may be repudiated. 0 8
By 1900, Tiedeman's attitude toward statutory regulation of economic
combinations was profoundly ambivalent and even contradictory. On the one
hand, anti-competitive practices should be allowed in order to preserve competi-
tion. On the other, competition that leads to monopolization should be banned.
Nonetheless, the common thread is that a competitive economy must be pre-
served even if it means, in effect, government action to ensure it. A competitive
economy is a higher aim than an unregulated, or even an efficient, economy.
But, of course, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was far too late to realis-
tically conceive of abolishing the corporate form. Tiedeman's proposal must
have seemed no more than that of an academic Quixote.
B. Competition Between Capital and Labor
The Progressive historians focussed only on Tiedeman's early statements of
opposition to organized labor and classed him with an undifferentiated group of
conservatives hostile to the rising force of labor in an expanding industrialized
economy. Although his views of organized labor became more positive in his
later work, as early as 1886, he had recognized the claims of labor as a legiti-
mate response to the growing concentration 'of wealth:
[W]e see, more and more clearly each day, that the tendency of the present process of
civilization is to concentrate social power into the hands of a few, who, unless re-
strained in some way, are able to dictate terms of employment to the masses, who
must either accept them or remain idle; ... at best they are barely enabled to provide
for the more pressing wants of themselves and families, while their employers are, at
least apparently, accumulating wealth to an enormous extent.2 07
However, at that time, he thought there was little that could be done for labor
consonant with preserving constitutional government:
205. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 610.
206. See Siegel, supra note 158, at 64.
207. LPP, supra note 8, at 569. For a similar view from a laissez-faire economist, see STURTEVANT. Eco-
NOMICS. OR THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH: A TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 242 (1877) cited in Benedict, supra
note 28, at 312 ("Surely while these great companies set so stupendous an example of combination to resist
competition, no one should be surprised that their employees combine for higher wages ... ).
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To place the working classes under special protection against the aggression of capital,
beyond the careful and strict enforcement of their rights; to compel the employer to
pay the rate of wages, determined by the State to be equitable, is to change the gov-
ernment from a government of freemen to a paternal government, or a despotism,
which is the same thing. 0 8
Workers would have to accept their inferior position as the inevitable con-
sequence of the unalterable laws of social evolution. The employer has the upper
hand "because his natural powers are greater, either intellectually or morally;
and the profits which naturally flow from this superiority, are but just rewards
of his own endeavors. At any rate, no law can successfully cope with these natu-
ral forces. 20 9 Any attempt by labor to change this situation by legislation
would be futile:
Law can never create social forces. On the contrary, law is the resultant of the social
forces. If the social forces at work at any given time produce an inequality in the
material conditions of classes of society, and give rise to the oppression of one class by
another; if the inferior class is not naturally strong enough to resist the oppression,
when free from legal restraints, no law can afford it protection.2 10
Thus, while Tiedeman's 1886 position on the relative rights of capital and
labor was hardly of a nature to lend aggressive support to the former, it did
seem to indicate the impossibility of bettering the conditions of labor through
legislation. But his position changed in the second edition, which was written
after the turbulent decade of the nineties had made clear that the characteristic
feature of the growing American economy was to be great concentrations of
capital in a single industrial or financial entity. He had originally believed that
all forms of combination in the economy were illegal, whether by labor or
capital:
A successful combination of labor will raise the price of labor and hence the cost of
the commodity above its normal value in the same manner as the combination of capi-
talists will increase the cost of the commodity by increasing the return to capital. Free
trade is only possible by a prohibition of both classes of combinations which, if suc-
cessful, are equally dangerous to the public safety and comfort.
21
'
208. LPP, supra note 8, at 571.
209. Id. at 570.
210. Id. at 571. This is the substantive jurisprudential totality of Chapter XIV, The Regulation of the Rela-
tion of Master and Servant, which Paul claims "hemmed in the legislative power at every point." PAUL, supra
note 23, at 45.
Even in the context of this class competition, Tiedeman carefully distinguished between the ordinary business
and that which is the product of a grant. Thus, the only exception to the bitter consequences of natural inequality
exists where there is a public interest in a business, which has been expressed in the granting of a franchise or
privilege to operate. Then state intervention is justified to resolve labor disputes because the legal equality of both
parties has been distorted by the government's grant to the employer. In order to keep railroads and telegraph
lines operating even during a labor dispute:
it is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State to compel both parties to submit their claims to
a competent tribunal, thus adjusting their differences, and preventing an injury to the public. There may
be a practical inability to enforce even such a law, because of the powerful political influence of the
capitalists; but it is nevertheless justifiable, on constitutional grounds, because the legal equality is dis-
turbed in these cases by the grant to the corporation of a franchise, a privilege not obtainable by the
workman.
LPP, supra note 8, at 573.
211. Id. at 247.
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But he later came to think that liberty of contract meant that unions themselves
were not criminal:
so far as they undertake to do no more than by combination to better their own condi-
tion, by dictating the terms of the contract of hiring for themselves. And in laying this
down as the law of the land, the courts have merely secured to the workman the same
liberty of contract, which the capitalist has enjoyed at the common law.212
By 1900, Tiedeman apparently had come to believe that labor's struggle was
another example of that competition in the economy which he was determined
to preserve. Thus, it could be pursued successfully by means of organization,
organization which was not inherently illegal and for which labor could seek
legislative support.
He recognized that labor's pursuit of legislative assistance to win shorter
hours and better working conditions was a direct consequence of the way in
which the doctrine of liberty of contract emphasized the relative weakness of
the single laborer in relation to the single employer:
If the legal equality, which is declared to exist between employer and employee, was a
reality, instead of a legal fiction, the laborer would not seek legislative interference in
his contractual relations with the employer .... [T]here can be no substantial equal-
ity between the man, who has not wherewith to provide himself with food and shelter
for the current day, and one, whether you call him capitalist or employer, who is able
to put the former into a position to earn his food and shelter. The employer occupies a
vantage ground which enables him, in a majority of cases, to practically dictate the
terms of employment. Liberty of contract, unrestricted, is to the laborer not always an
unmixed blessing. 13
Though he has been vouchsafed this insight, the courts have not: "[T]he consti-
tutional guaranty of liberty of contract is intended to operate equally and im-
partially upon both employer and employee; and we find, therefore, that most of
the attempts at legislative interference are pronounced unreasonable, and hence
unconstitutional. 21 4
Tiedeman also came to approve of state laws which exempted labor unions
from antitrust statutes. Some might consider such a law "an unconstitutional
discrimination against the capitalist and an unauthorized favoring of the labor-
ing classes in the industrial warfare," 215 but the legislation can withstand that
attack:
[T]his legislation is an undoubted ...determination of the State to diminish the
natural inequalities of capital and labor .... When one considers this matter, apart
from the fiction of equality of all men before the law, and from the technical rules of
constitutional law which rest upon that fiction, it does not seem unreasonable.2 16
Of course, unless such a statutory exception is made, "the irresistible con-
clusion is that all labor combinations, in restraint of trade and competition, are
prohibited by these anti-trust statutes, as much so as are the combinations of
212. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 419.
213. Id. at 315.
214. Id. at 316.
215. Id. at 423.
216. Id. at 423-24.
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capital."21 7 But Tiedeman was not, in fact, evenhanded in his view; he believed
anti-competitive combinations of capital, like trusts, were appropriately barred
by statute or common law, even though pro-competitive combinations of labor
or smallholders might not be.
C. Searching for a Coherent View of Competition
The thinking underlying this duality becomes clearer in Tiedeman's discus-
sion of combinations of capital and of labor and the statutes that aimed to con-
trol them, in the context of the well-known English case, Mogul Steamship Co.
v. McGregor.218 As we have seen, much anti trust legislation he regarded as ill-
considered and poorly constructed. 219 That language was probably a response to
Holmes' discussion of the same issue in the context of the same case. In an 1894
article, Holmes had argued that there are "very serious legislative considera-
tions which have to be weighed" in deciding the legality of combinations, and
those should not be left to "unconscious prejudice or half conscious inclina-
tion." 220 In language which must have grated on Tiedeman, he said, "The time
has gone by when law is only an unconscious embodiment of the common will.
It has become a conscious reaction upon itself of organized society knowingly
seeking to determine its own destinies. 221
Still more provoking, Holmes rejected sic utere, Tiedeman's "fundamental
rule" of human law,222 as a useful guide to such decisions:
Questions of policy are legislative questions, and judges are shy of reasoning from such
grounds ... decisions for or against the privilege [to damage another], which really
can stand only upon such grounds, often are presented as hollow deductions from
empty general propositions like sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which teaches
nothing but a benevolent yearning.223
Holmes believed that a regime of free competition could not coherently deny
labor the right to compete with capital on the grounds that workers seek to
weaken or destroy their employer's business; every competitor does that and yet
the injuries due to competition are privileged. Where the issue is the legality of
combinations designed to injure competitors, whether class or business rivals,
the "ground of decision really comes down to a proposition of policy ....
[J]udges with different economic sympathies might.., decide such a case dif-
ferently when brought face to face with the issue."22
But Tiedeman's snort at "ill-considered" legislation was not accompanied
by any disagreement with Holmes as to the proper outcome of the question of
whether capitalist and labor combinations were equally privileged to do injury.
He advised "a rigid adherence" to what he called:
217. Id. at 420.
218. 21 Q.B.D. 544 (1888), affid, 1892 App. Cas. 25.
219. See supra text accompanying note 191.
220. Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. RaV. 1, 9 (1894).
221. Id.
222. See supra text accompanying note 53.
223. Holmes, supra note 220, at 3.
224. Id. at 8.
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the individualistic principle of the liberty of all, in the industrial warfare, - which is
now being waged, year by year with greater intensity, - to do anything which does
not constitute a trespass upon the rights of others, as long as the motive of the act,
which may be injurious to others, is the promotion of the material welfare of the
actors.
2 25
In fact, Tiedeman believed that inequality required laborers to combine and did
not consider such combination to coerce employers ipso facto illegal. If employ-
ees strike:
in order to obtain an increase in wages for themselves or to better the terms and
conditions of their employment, which they professedly have a right to do, the ...
strike is not converted into an unlawful conspiracy, because in their effort to win their
battle the workmen ... endeavor, to cripple the employer's business, as long as they do
not do acts and employ means, which are in themselves unlawful. The intent to cripple
the employer's business is necessary to a successful strike.226
Tiedeman, like Holmes,227 discussed Mogul from this perspective. Mogul
held that the commercially competitive aim of destroying the business of rivals
by combination was not actionable under the common law so long as only law-
ful mearis were used. It impliedly raised the question, Tiedeman notes, 228 of
why labor could not combine against employers in its struggle with capital.
"Both kinds of combinations are engaged in an industrial war, and both are
actuated by the same motive, viz.: the procurement of better prices for the com-
modities, which they have to sell . . ,,229 Ultimately, then, the necessity to beat
back the great concentrations of wealth justified both the organization of work-
ers and the nationalization of monopolies.
IX. CONCLUSION
Tiedeman, in his later work, was considering some of the key legal puzzles
of an expanding market economy: Does the law disallow competitive acts other-
wise lawful simply because they create a monopoly by successfully eliminating
competitors? If so, what level of government intervention is required to main-
tain competition? If not, is there to be no legal restraint on economic concentra-
tion? Does the public interest protect a competitive marketplace or an efficient
one? Is there a legal right to carry on small-scale trade, or is the success of
combination simply another aspect of the competitve evolutionary struggle for
survival? And is it equally acceptable for labor to combine to gain an advantage
over capital, in that competition? 230
225. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 444.
226. Id. at 429.
227. Holmes, supra note 220, at 7 passim.
228. 1 SFC, supra note 8, at 465.
229. Id. at 442.
230. For further recent discussion of these questions as they were considered in the nineties, see M. SKLAR.
THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM. 1890-1916: THE MARKET. THE LAW AND POLITICS
(1988); Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J.
1017 (1988); May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Anti-
trust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. LJ. 257 (1989); Peritz, The 'Rule of Reason' in Antitrust Law: Property
Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS Li. 285 (1989).
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The concept of competition was under tremendous pressure in the Gilded
Age - concentrations of both capital and labor appeared to be the natural
product of the developing economy. The outcome of competition was anti-com-
petitive. It was surely more efficient, but for smallholders, efficiency could not
justify the contraction of competition. They saw themselves as the heirs of the
Framers, those for whom the Constitution was designed. Whatever the tenden-
cies of the economy, whatever the sentiment of the public, the Constitution
must offer protection to them. Tiedeman thought that, if one accepted the prin-
ciple that the preservation of a small-scale economy was central to the success
of the republic, and thus could be read as embedded in the Constitution, the
answers to the nagging questions of competition and concentration could be an-
swered judicially, rather than legislatively, and through the use of simple and
scientific rules.
In this manner, he attempted to escape the quandary Holmes had pointed
out in trying to answer the same questions: The motto that people are free to do
as they will so long as they do no injury is not a useful guide in a regime which
expects, indeed thrives on, the injuries dealt in competition. The injury inflicted
in competition is a consequence of the privilege to do such injury, which is
granted by the law. Tiedeman's answer was that the privilege to injure could be
rescinded. "No one has a natural right to do that which injures another. If the
law permits him to do this it is a privilege, which may be revoked at any time
by the proper authority." '' When economic concentration injures labor, labor
may organize; when it injures smallholders, its privilege should be revoked be-
cause the preservation of a smallholders' economy is "the concern of the
government." 23
2
The rationale was that some kinds of property are not really private, but
public: their very existence is a consequence of public grants to private individu-
als. He combined the Spencerian denigration of the state as the anti-evolution-
ary protector of the weak with the Jacksonian notion of the opposition of prop-
erty and privilege. He reached the grand conclusion that great economic
concentrations owed their existence not to success in competition but to the an-
ticompetitive intervention of the state. It was precisely the evolutionarily detri-
mental and artificial intervention of the state which was tilting the natural bal-
ance against smallholders. Only the restitutional intervention of the state to
recapture those privileges it had unequally disbursed could restore the competi-
tive balance of the economy.
The Spencerian doctrine remained useful to Tiedeman even when the econ-
omy became dominated by great concentrations of capital at the foot of which
small businesses scrambled for a toehold. Then, Tiedeman was willing to call
for government intervention to protect erstwhile competitive failures on the
ground that concentration in the economy was the consequence of government
intervention, rather than the inevitable progress of the economy powered by the
competitive struggle for survival. Tiedeman's opposition to regulation as govern-
231. LPP, supra note 8, at 425.
232. Government Ownership, supra note 17, at 482.
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ment intervention in the eighties became the late nineties' notion that govern-
ment intervention was responsible for economic concentration.
By the time his revision of the police power treatise was published in 1900,
Tiedeman was arguing that the state, for whose power he had sought limits as a
bar to the redistributive force of democratic majorities, should exercise that
power to take over banks, railroads, insurance companies, public utilities, and
communications. Only thus could private property be preserved. The doctrine of
the police power, once broad and comprehensive, then recast as a limitation on
democratic majorities, Tiedeman now urged as a force powerful enough to de-
rail the juggernaut of economic concentration. By the end of his life, he was an
antimajoritarian statist, seeking in the power of the state the means to preserve
a dying form: a national economy of smallholders.
The intellectual justification for Tiedeman's statism was a peculiar combi-
nation of pre-industrial notions of property and pseudo-scientific versions of
Darwinian evolution. Its real interest is not so much its theoretical underpin-
nings as what it reveals about the plight of a group which, having had the
power to make the law, has now lost it. It can no longer determine what the law
is to be, but must follow the lead of others. It understands that law is contingent
upon public opinion, for it has seen that opinion, and then the law, change.
Tiedeman himself is fighting a rearguard battle for the ideological struc-
tures - the social nature of property, the distinction between property and
privilege, government control of monopolies, the importance of competition, and
the freedom of small business from regulation - which served smallholders in
the period of their ascendancy. He is trying to adapt these structures to the
situation in which there are new powers in the land. In fact, he fails. Far from
being the herald of new doctrines of laissez-faire, as the Progressive historians
had it, Tiedeman is the last bugler of a lost regiment.
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